Women & War ...........In IR perspective

Introduction

I start with a story. Once, a white male physicist and several of his colleagues were working on modeling counter-force attacks, trying to get realistic estimates of the number of immediate fatalities that would result from different deployments. At one point, they remodeled a particular attack, using slightly different assumptions, and found that instead of there being 36 million immediate fatalities, there would only be 30 million. And everyone was sitting around nodding, saying, "Oh yeah, that is great, only thirty million", when all of a sudden the physicist heard what they were saying. And he blurted out, "Wait, I’ve just heard how we are talking – only 30 million! Only 30 million human beings killed instantly?" Silence fell upon the room. Nobody said a word. They did not even look at him. It was awful, he says. He felt like a woman. The physicist added that henceforth, he was careful to never blurt out anything like that again.

Why was feeling like a woman such a bad thing for him? Who has decided that feeling like a woman, when you are biologically not one, is something that should be avoided at all cost? And who decides what a woman would or should feel? Let us look at it in another manner, how does one become a man?

What are little boys made up of? While the nursery rhyme suggests "snips and snails and puppy dogs’ tails", there seems to be a more adult and less fanciful force at play. One account of this could be that given by psychologist John Money, who extended embryological understandings into the realm of psychological development. It is said that usually ‘XX’ babies grow up to be females. And ‘XY’s become males, due to a ‘Sex Determining Gene’ on the Y, also called the Master Sex Determining Gene. Females, on the other hand, are said to be the default sex, they just happen in the absence of the Master gene.

Is this limited to the biological, or does it have social implications? John Money and other medical managers use the following rule of thumb: Genetic females should always be raised as females, preserving reproductive potential, regardless of how severely the patients are virilized. In the genetic male, however, the gender of assignment is based on the infant’s anatomy, predominantly, the size of the phallus.

At birth then, masculinity becomes a social phenomenon. For proper masculine socialization to occur, the little boy must have attributes that leave no doubt in the boy’s mind, in the minds of the parents and other adult relatives, or in the minds of his male peers about the legitimacy of his male identification. In the world of John Money and other managers of inter-sexuality, men are ‘made’, not born. Proper socialization becomes more important than genetics. ‘Normally’ developing little boys must be active and willing to push one another around; maleness and aggression go together. Eventually, little boys become socialized into appropriate adult behavior. They do not dream of marriage, but of careers and a professional future. A healthy, adolescent girl, in contrast, must fantasize about falling in love, marrying and raising children. Only a masculinized girl (therefore an anomaly) dreams of a professional future.

The reason why I went into all this is because this brings to the fore the often confused terms of ‘gender’ and ‘sex’. ‘Sex’ is a biological term. One is born in a certain sex – a male child or a female child. But one is made a man/masculine or a woman/feminine. This is gender – a social construction. Gender is what is used to give sex its seemingly pre-ordained characteristics. It tells one what to expect of one born a man or one born a woman, what roles should each be playing, so that this world is ‘easy’ and ‘unchaotic’. But who decides these roles, these traits? And are we, safe from its claws?

By gender I mean the constellation of meanings that a given culture assigns to biological sex differences. But more than that, as Carol Cohn says, it is a symbolic system, one that not only shapes how we experience and understand ourselves as women and men, but that also interweaves with other discourses and shapes them. While real women and real men do not really fit these gender ‘ideals’, the existence of this system of meanings affects all of us, nevertheless. A man who cries easily cannot avoid in some way confronting that he is likely to be seen as less than fully manly. That was the reason why the white, male physicist felt awful. He saw himself as a deviant from the way a ‘typical man’ is supposed to be. He spoke in a manner usually associated with women and thus associated with all that is seen to be as womanly – irrational, emotional, less aggressive and so on. It is just not done to let your feelings come forth in professional meetings.

Conventionally, masculinity and feminity have been treated as natural, not created. Today, however, there is mounting evidence that they have not only been created, but also that they have been surprisingly hard to perpetuate. It has required the daily exercise of power.

Power infuses all relations, especially so, international relations. The interactions of nations with one another is seen to be in a setting where each is out to get the other. It is a world marked by anarchy and self-help, where any sign of weakness can be fatal. And as a result of this view of the world, it has also been seen as a typically ‘masculine’ sphere. Only men, not women or children, have been imagined capable of the sort of decisiveness international relations is assumed to require. Many a times I wonder why women and not men had to fight for their suffrage rights? Who decided that men could vote, while women could not? That is because, only those who can protect the boundaries of their country, in this dangerous world, were worthy enough to be citizens. No one questioned this portrayal of the world as permeated by risk and violence. No one even attempted to redefine "danger". Instead the vision that informed foreign policy was of a world in which taking risks was proof of one’s qualifications to govern. And when it is a patriarchal world that is "dangerous", masculine men and feminine women are expected to behave in opposite but complementary ways. A ‘real man’ will become the protector in such a world. He’ll suppress his own fears, brace himself and step forward to defend the weak, women and children. In the same dangerous world, women will turn gratefully and expectantly to their fathers, brothers and husbands. In this fashion, the "dangerous world" is upheld by unspoken notions about masculinity and feminity. Ideas of masculinity have to be perpetuated to justify foreign-policy risk-taking. And women, who naturally cannot help but be incapable of thinking violently, are effectively kept out of policy making, as well as of implementation, in the form of the army. I seek to pay attention to the way women have been convincingly kept out of the army for so long. If the world is really that dangerous then, by being kept out, women are being constantly marginalised.

Let us say we accept this view of the world. After all in a world inhabited by fiercely sovereign states, it is not too difficult to believe that one of the ‘dangers’ inflicting this world is one of independent states pitted against one another. Genetic determinants say that the force motivating animal behavior is the passing on of genes to the next generation. In order to compete effectively with others, therefore, there are genes for aggression found in the male, who is responsible for evolution and the passing on of genes. And therefore, since men are programmed for aggression, fighting in wars is "natural" for men.

Almost indulgently, Fukuyama says that the basic social problem that any society faces is to control the aggressive tendencies of its young men. There seems to be an acceptance of the fact that men are naturally aggressive. They can’t be any other way. And that is why it is but natural that they play an important role in international relations and in active military activities. Women are less willing than men to use force, he says, because of their roles as mothers, etc. He doesn’t feel the need to go deep into the reasons for why women are less militaristic than men are. For him it is sufficient to know that increasing participation of women in the relations between countries will probably make democracies less inclined to use power around the world, and that is a bad thing to happen. Also, for him, entry of women into traditionally male areas, like the army, leads to other worries. The integrating of men and women into the same combat units, where they will be in close physical proximity over long periods of time, poses serious problems. Also, unit cohesion, which is the bedrock on which the performance of armies rests, has been traditionally built around male bonding, which can only get jeopardized only when men start competing with one another for the attention of women. Thus, Fukuyama feels that gender segregation in the military seems appropriate. Is that his only cause for worry?

Lionel Tiger and Robin Fox say that war "is not a human action; war is not a human problem but a male problem." Men, they say, have evolved as hunters who band into groups and turn their aggressiveness out against common enemies or prey. Political structures in modern societies are formed on this primeval hunting model, and, naturally, men dominate these structures. D.P. Brash accepts the idea that males bond and exclude women from political power. There is a cultural idea in most societies that men are the warriors. Sometimes in the early 1800s a political cartoon appeared in the newspaper of the French feminist organization, Les Droits de la Femme (Women’s Rights). Under the heading Universal Suffrage, a man and a woman are shown placing ballots in a ballot box. The man’s ballot box is marked WAR and the woman’s ballot is marked PEACE. This cartoon too, brings to the fore, the almost universally accepted belief that men make wars, women oppose violence, and the additional implication that women are against wars because they are nurturers. Also among the shared characteristics of the male gender ethos is an emphasis on a well-defined sense of self, individual autonomy and self-reliance. The emphasis establishes a "we-they" understanding of relationships and promotes competition in which there are clear winners and losers. War requires a view of another nation or race of people as an enemy with whom we share little and whom, therefore, a soldier can hate and kill with honor. Masculinity similarly depends in large part on the distinction between people, both among and between men and women. The male gender ethos is often defined in terms of qualities that are most clearly not-female or nonfeminine. Men learn to assume that real men are the opposites of real women, and therefore have no qualms about going to war, unlike women. Also, Janet Lever’s studies of children’s games reveal that boys are most likely than girls to play team sports in which winning is emphasized. Such games requires a "we" opposed to "they" who must be beaten. Girls, on the other hand, play games that require co-operation. When conflicts develop, what interests boys more, is allegedly, the result and not their friendship. (Anybody, who has read All’s Quiet on the Western Front, knows that is not true. Also, this goes against the basic premise of male bonding.) Supposedly, girls try to resolve conflicts by mediation, etc. (is that because of biology or conditioning?) Other studies have suggested that boys learn (the operative word being learn) early to focus on objects and tools in problem solving, a focus that might direct them toward technology rather than inter personal interaction in their social and political behavior. As technology acquires masculine overtones, its use appears to promote masculine values and vice versa. In military jargon too, terms used to describe and define weapons and weapon delivery systems often have quite explicit connotations that support the connection of male sexuality with war and other forms of violence. In her book, entitled Missile Envy, Helen Caldicott gives examples of missile erector, deep penetration. Whether or not the weapons are phallic, they are perceived to be phallic. As if overt displays of affinity between war, weapons and maleness wasn’t enough, other reasons given for the prohibition of women in the army is that women would procreate like bunnies without paternal control of the progeny. Senator Sam Ervin also feared that a basic rationale for war – a man’s desire to protect the women at home – would be destroyed by the presence of women soldiers. Men cannot be men if they cannot protect their women. If girls, too, were in the swamps and jungles, what would the boys be fighting to preserve? Women are not considered to be reliable in the crunch. (What about men? Have they never been fearful or scared in battlefields?)

The right to fight – to participate in combat and to command combat troops – is important for any powerless group, because then one has the assurance of being recognized as a citizen. But if women were allowed into combat, it would take away from men, their dominance of the moral imperatives that derive from war. One other reason for not allowing women into the army is that militants are taught to cultivate misogyny, so as to ensure that they abhor all traits feminine. Finally, if women took up arms, their sex would no longer be seen as spoils of war; they would lose their status as objects to be won and used and therefore protected.

Is it really right to generalize about an entire category in this manner? That men are, as an entire group, more aggressive and war-prone, while women are not? Even though in this world, war may be seen as inevitable, it is not like the powers that be (usually men) have made no attempts to peacefully resolve conflicts. If war came that naturally to men, they should be looking for excuses to wage war. Also, any meaningful definition of aggression, can not be done, without looking at the opportunities available, the access to resources and so on. The question is not whether some people are more aggressive than others are or not, but how likely they are to act in a particular way, in this setting, given the opportunities it affords. Perhaps, then, having a woman in the Pentagon, with all the opportunities for action, wouldn’t make much of a difference.

Women do fight. There seems to be no essential or biological reason for why women can not fight. The presence of servicewomen in various armed forces of the world, is proof enough. And whenever there is a shortage of qualified men, militaries make use of women, who act as reserve labor force. But their existence, even as a reserve force, lays claim to the fact that they are not naturally ‘anti-militaristic’. In France, during the time of the revolution, the women did not flinch any more than their husband or brothers did, at the application of the Terror to those ‘suspected of internal conspiracy’ (remember those knitting ladies, in the Tale of Two Cities, who used to sit next to the guillotine, while the heads rolled?). Women commit infanticide, abuse and kill, mutilate the genitals of little girls, and so on. They have been known to encourage and defend male violence. Historically, cultures formed around violence, have always had women’s support. Some of the earliest deities worshipped by humans, were females, not only as nurturing, earth mothers, but more so as huntresses and avid consumers of blood. And in the not so very distant past, the role played by women in Operation Desert Shield and Operation Storm, and the generally acknowledged high quality of women’s performance in their jobs, lays invalid any argument about women’s ability to perform in a crunch. The USA was in the front, in integrating women into the armed forces. It must not have been all that bad, because 6 NATO nations have gone the same way.

The other problematic imagery is that of wild, aggressive men standing on the borders of their countries and their homes, beating their hairy chests and challenging their equally aggressive enemies. Francis Fukuyama locates the well-spring of war in aggressive male instincts. But is this true? No instinct can make anyone, not even a man, wants to go to battle. In all societies, warriors had to be and still have to be taunted/transformed into animal form before battle. Wars do not happen because hot-blooded men got together and decided they wanted to have a war. Wars are organized, many times by people who may not personally be violent. But then, that is realpolitik. It is young men who fight. But, how willingly? If war is so appealing to male genes, why has every war required a draft? Why does today’s army have to tout the fringe benefits, to attract more recruits? Men must be attracted and then trained to kill other people. Without this training, it is difficult to be able to go out and take lives, cold-bloodedly. Even if we accept that it comes ‘naturally’ to kill, does dying come ‘naturally’?

Why have women been seen as ones touting peace? There may be many reasons. Firstly, if war represented male control, then, dismantling the military raises hopes that one day the gender structure of power may also be dismantled. Also, Virginia Wolf says, that women are not by nature opposed to war, any more than men are war-like. But women have greater potential to be opposed to war, because of their exclusion from power and wealth. Thus, female pacifists could say, "As a woman, I have no country. As a woman I want no country" because even the notion of nationhood is masculine. Also, as women are not allowed to bear arms, ‘pacifism’ may be seen as "enforced upon them", because they have no stake in them. Maybe, in a world going mad with militarism, pacifism had more chances of being heard and to influence policies. Whatever be the reason, generalizations are misleading. Men are not a plague; women are not the cure.

The importance of all this is that some else decides that women are pacifists, and that it is a bad thing to be, takes decisions for women and then make policies, to keep women effectively out of the military. In India, of course, biological reasons are given to only supplement other reasons given to keep women out. These reasons can be anything. They can be that women are the ‘matriarchs’ and are central to the family. Without a mother, the family would disintegrate. This, when women have not much rights or freedoms. The other reason that is given is that women are inherently pure. And they would pollute themselves as ideals to be worshipped, or they would not be able to adjust to the harsh life the military required, or that they would not be able to take fast decisions and so on. And then there is the constant harking back to mythology. Even though Hindu mythology is full of negative images of women, but men worship the image of the creator, rather than that of the destroyer. And personally, I also feel that where women in mythology have been shown to be aggressive, a simultaneous message has also been flashed that she was that powerful, only because the Gods chose to give her their powers. Like in the case of Mahisasuramardini. That she would be nothing on her own. In all types of androgynes in myth and art, primacy is given to the male half. In the androgen of Harihar, Vishnu is put on the left side, the side usually reserved for the female consorts, because he was in the form of Mohini, at the time of the union of Shiva and Vishnu. Could that be the reason why, as an important religious symbol, Harihar has been relatively de-emphasized in monographs on Vaisnavism?

Connecting Hindu mythology with the absence of women in the Indian armed forces, in combat roles, one can also look at Vishnu-Mohini, which reflects a more active feminity, which has to be captured and turned procreator. These are ways of conveying how patriarchy needs to control these powerful elements of the feminine. There is no immediate rejection, but an incorporation, so as to be bale to assert patriarchal power more cohesively. Incorporation is a more powerful means of domination than rejection. Mythologies are creations of men. We believed whatever they chose to tell. And like all other social constructions, like family, society and so on, they too seek to perpetuate the interests and the power of the write and narrator – the men. All try to retain the dominance of men in every sphere of life. Projection of women as the mother, as the force behind the man and the close – knit family, as the personification of all things pure and good, are reflected in all spheres of life and definitely so, in the armed forces. If women entered the armed forces, they would take away from the men, a big proof of their masculinity. Thus all sorts of phenomena are employed to convince Indian women that it is not a ‘good’ or ‘right’ thing for them to want to be in the military. They should leave it to their men to take care of them. After all, they are not like "those" women.

Conclusion

All this is assuming that the world is really dangerous and women want to be a part of a violent discourse like the military. Maybe the truth is that women or even men can envisage a different world, or tomorrow technology may become so advanced that gender would not make any difference, because machines would be able to do all the work on their own. Or women may themselves not want to be a part of such a violent discourse. My whole point of this exercise would be to see if I am justified in wanting the choice to be left to the women themselves to make. If men can have the right to decide for themselves, surely women can too. And what are the reasons given for why women still do not have this freedom of choice? Why do people feel that Indian women cannot decide for themselves? And why have we believed it? After all, Indian women have been militaristic enough, historically to not have to believe anyone that says just about anything about them. Yet, we do. These are questions that have remained not only unanswered but also unvoiced. I believe that the time has come that they should be raised and whatever be truth should at be revealed rather than relying on the myths and assumptions that have been the creation of society for so many millennia. We must know, only then can we find a way to live with ourselves.

Ancient India in South East Asia ........

Introduction

 By the early centuries of the Christian era, many parts of Southeast Asia and India were part of the world-trading network. Though this period was marked by the domination of Indian Ocean by roman trade, it also witnessed the establishment of trade relations between India and Southeast Asia. It has been argued that this relationship further resulted in the colonization of south east Asia, but the argument has been firmly countered in the wake of recent research, which emphasize on the mutual influence, rather than partial view of one-sided influence. In this paper, an attempt has been made to study the process of state-formation vis-à-vis the interplay of trade to examine the role-played by indigenous factors and the influence of ‘indic’ elements. It also presents an analysis of relations behind the increased economic activities (trade also) between India and Southeast Asia from 5-6th century onwards and the resultant socio-political, economic and cultural impact of this relationship on both regions.

The sources for this early relationship between India and Southeast Asia and the scanty and ambiguous in nature. South east Asia has been portrayed and referred as the ‘golden island’ or "Golden Peninsula" or Yavadipa or Suvarnadipa in the Indian literature from the first centuries AD Apart from Ramayana, the Buddhist Jataka fables also mention about south east Asia. Chinese records provide a satisfactory, yet still incomplete view of the burgeoning Southeast Asian commerce. In the last few decades, archaeological excavations at various sites in southeast Asia has resulted in the yielding of various remains, which presents an entirely different and new picture of the region. The availability of epigraphic sources and inscriptions at various places has been of great use in reconstructing the history of this region. The various categories of inscriptions are Sanskrit, Tamil and indigenous language inscriptions.

Cultural Dependency?

As far as state-formation is concerned, the maritime region has been well served partly due to paucity of intractability of the data, and partly to the fact that most of the scholars dealing with early history of maritime regions are struggling to produce adequate description of the states of the later first millenium AD . The reflections of the Indian ideas, beliefs and religious culture upon the monumental, artistic and literary remains of the early historic states of south east Asia made the scholar argue for the colonisation/Indianisation of the region. Coedes argued that the contact with the Brahmana-Buddhist culture of India resulted in the formation of the states that were culturally dependent on India. Mabbett argued for the borrowing of ideology and leadership apart from the agricultural technology that made possible the establishment of the first states in the region.

This proposition began to be questioned when scholars raised the problem of the identity of the Indian incomers and the circumstances under which they arrived and interacted with the local population. Van Heur argued that the local populace was active participants in the process, though he argued that necessary political and social skills for state-building were acquired from India as these essential ingredients were assumed to be missing in local societies. He argued that the local rulers, having learned of Indian culture through interaction with Indians on the maritime route, recognized the advantages of certain elements of Indian civilization and drew from the Indian tradition for their own benefit.

O. W. Wolters stressed the idea of a mutual sharing process in the evolution of Indianised statecraft in Southeast Asia. The initial contact with the knowledge of Indian cultural tradition came through the south East Asian sailors. The local-rulers, recognizing the fact that Indian culture provided certain opportunities for administrative and technological advantages vis-à-vis their rivals, followed up on these contacts. Thus the initiative was south east Asian, not Indian, and it was a slow process of cultural synthesis rather than Indianisation made possible by the imposition of Hinduism by the influx of the Brahmanas. He continues that southeast Asian region was characterized by the tribal societies, ruled by chiefs and thus, there was no indigenous sense of kingdom and its supra-territorial demands of loyalty among the south east Asians themselves. The rulers/chiefs rather than developing state institutions initiated religious cults to command over the native population.

Der Casparis argued against this proposition of Indianisation and its continuity from early centuries of the Christian era to the later times as first contact was made in the peripheral areas which lacked continuity to central areas (east Kalimantan & 8th century Mataram). He substituted the proposition by a complicated network of relations, both between various parts of each of the two great regions and between the two regions themselves. Apart from south India, Northeastern India (Bengal, Bizarre and Orrin) also played an important part and at time, predominated in some regions. Same is the case with Southeast Asia.

Kulke proposed ‘convergence hypothesis’ to highlight the relative lateness of state-formation in the eastern and southern portions of Indian subcontinent with which south east Asia had the most contact. He points out that the convergence is well demonstrated in the beginning of temple construction in Java within decades of its inception in south India.

Paul Wheatly argued that the early southeast Asian society was marked by chiefdom, among whom the instrumental exchanges characteristic of a reciprocative mode of integration dominated. Entrepreneurial advances associated with developing commerce created social imbalances as ‘redistributive exchange’ system emerged-(Funan’s case). He holds that several southeast Asian societies developed into ‘mobilisative sectors’ economics, which developed organizational mechanisms for the acquisition, control and disposal of resources in pursuit of collective goals (generally political) and impersonalism took hold. This led to the development of state-institutions and transformation of chiefs into rulers. The process is detailed but what leads to such changes has not been discussed by Wheatly, as there exist changing views concerning the nature of early exchange. The important point on his suggestions concerning the potential destabilizing effects of partial borrowings of economic and political institutions from other cultures, which may be expected to provoke continuing change with the recipient cultures until a new equilibrium can be established.

Trade & State Formation

The importance of trade in political developments and the possibility of archaeological recovery of the phase of transition from lower to higher levels of political integration through study of evidence from changing trade patterns have begun to be exposed in maritime south east Asia. Archaeological sources have supported the argument that long-distance sea trade itself played a key role in stimulating political development which eventually led to the formation of state. J.W. Christie divides the maritime Southeast Asia into three distinct groupings. The first grouping covers the end of the pre-historic period in the maritime region (5th century BC to 5th century AD), the archaeological remains of which includes megalithic burial sites, inhumation, hoards, boat fragments and settlement sites. The second grouping comprises several set of early inscriptions on stone found in the region, a few other archaeological remains and some other vague references in Chinese records, dating 5th and 6th centuries AD The third grouping dates 7th to 8th centuries AD , and comprises further collections of inscriptions, some rather more reliable Chinese and a number of monumental structures and structural remains assumed to have been produced during this period. Now, it is pertinent to discuss the process of state-formation in few parts of Southeast Asia, as it will help locating the role of indigenous factors/developments.

The two foci of early state-formation in the maritime Southeast Asia were the Malacca Straits and the southern sea of the Java shore. These were also the centers of wealth accumulation and trading activities and shared a number of basic political concepts. Political developments occurred in the region owing to the response given by the coastal communities to the same external economic stimuli. The increasing wealth in these two sub-regions was increasingly concentrated in the hands of politically powerful elite who exercised some control over prestige-goods economies. Moreover, the contacts with other regions brought advanced metallurgical techniques and enhanced resource-base of the region to trade. This expansion of economic base of a number of trading communities, possibly in conjunction with increased exposure to more developed political cultures, led to the formation of a series, first of chiefdoms, and then, of nascent states, on the relevant coasts of peninsula and the western islands. Same was the case with Funan, which rose on the account of developed trade and port facilities owing to strategic location and supported by an agrarian base. K.R. Hall argues that Funan may be considered as the first south east Asian ‘state’ as it was an economic center, with an economic base that supported a more sophisticated level of political integration, and acted as the locus of contact between various regional and local marketing networks. Thus the pre-existing indigenous cultural and ethnic diversity were synthesized with external ideology to create a new systematic higher order cultural base. This is documented in the growing use of Sanskrit in Funan (Sanskrit inscription of 3rd century AD), use of Indian vocabulary and technical knowledge.

Thus trade appears to have been key to economic growth control of trade appears to have provided the key to political development. Moreover, trade in this region was information maximizing as it carried a substantial baggage of information and ideas alongwith material commodities. This suggests that the carriers of most of this trade were members of maritime Southeast Asian communities rather than outsiders. Here, an important point to be noted is that none of the communities on the east coast of the Indian sub-continent or on the mainland of southeast Asia, involved in trade at this time, belonged to sophisticated or powerful state and all these communities were in the process of transforming themselves politically. Thus interaction at this time was on a fairly equal basis. Thus it is evident that in the early period before 200 BC, the above was the case whereas till 300 AD the other argument of outside stimuli would have been the case. The economic stimulation came from India and China, whereas the political and cultural stimulation of the region was primarily from Indian sub-continent, probably carried along Buddhist commercial network. The period between 300-600 AD witnessed several fully formed states in this maritime region. Clear differences began to develop during this period between coastal trading states of the Malice straits and the increasingly mixed economy. The coastal trading states extended the use of Buddhism as a commercial networking religion, pulling ports of north and west Borneo into their cultural orbit. The elite groups in the states of the Java sea and their dependencies began to add elements of Hinduism-with its royal and agrarian overtones-to the already existing Buddhist cum ‘Megalithic’ cultural mix of the ports, as they began to attach farming population of the interior to their coastal centers. Lastly by the 7th-9th century AD, when states in both the sub-regions began to produce literature in the indigenous language, it is apparent that the old, small states were being increasingly absorbed into larger, more complex political entities.

Trade with India

After discussing the process of state-formation in the Southeast Asian region, owing more to indigenous factors with the restricted use of Indian elements, it is significant to discuss the trade between the two regions that brought about this interaction and consequent influences. K.R. Hall has presented four reasons behind growth of this trade. Firstly, historians have theorized that gold became difficult to acquire during this time due to internal disturbances in the central Asian steppe region and slowing down of flow of Roman gold coins. As a consequence Indian merchants ventured into Southeast Asia looking for the mythical wealth of the "Islands of Gold". Secondly, it was due to revolution in boat construction and navigation techniques, which increased the sizes of the ships and sailing efficiency. Thirdly, the adequate ideological support provided by Buddhism played a great role as evident in the distribution of outstanding Dipankara statues of Buddha throughout southeast Asia. And last reason was the Chinese interest. Much of the interaction between Indian and maritime southeast Asian economies were driven by interest in the trade of the South China Sea and the eastern seas of Indonesia. Thus the Southeast Asian trade was entirely dependent upon the Indian Ocean and South China Sea.

In the first three centuries of the Christian era, the trading relation with India is established by the distribution of Roman-Indian Rouletted pottery at few coasts including north coasts of Java and Bali and the coast of central Vietnam. In the period between 300-600 AD, Buddhism, pilgrimage grew which reflects commercial links with India and China.

The Southeast Asian trade is well documented after 7th century AD onwards. The 7th and 8th century AD witnessed expansion in volume of Asian sea trade involving maritime southeast, due to Chinese interest and parallel rise in the demand from the prosperous centers on the east coast of India. The regions which benefited the most were Javanese State of Ho-ling and Malacca straits port hierarchy of Srivijaya, which also created a bi-polar pattern of trade networking in the archipelago. This was followed by a decline of trade in the late 8th and the 9th centuries owing to the disintegration of the Pallava states in south India. This argument is reinforced not only by epigraphic data from the peninsula and northeast India, but also by archaeological evidence that a postage route across Isthmus of Kra was in use for some decades in that century.

The period between early tenth and the early thirteenth centuries was marked by an economic boom, benefiting maritime Southeast Asia the most and it affected sea trade in both the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea. The dominant economic force in the eastern sector of the Indian Ocean was the grouping of several south Indian merchant associations or Banigrama, which operated under the aegis of the expanding Chola Empire. Trade in southern and eastern India began to benefit from political consolidation under the Cholas. The maritime trade boom of this period included greater commercial activity, volumes of trade, range of commodities and the number of regular participants were far greater and the region directly involved was far more extensive. The effects on the Indonesian archipelago included increasing carrier of larger volume, lower value cargoes between islands as well as a number of technological and agricultural innovations, particularly in Java and Bali, stimulated by a combination of overseas market opportunities and domestic market pressures.

The Chola raids on many southeast Asian ports including Srivijaya itself seems to be more because of the economic interest, rather than mere expansion of territory. Moreover, the effects of these raids appear, for the most part, to have been minimal and transitory and soon Srivijaya grew wealthy. The decline of Srivijaya trade after 1028 AD has been countered by Christie as one points to a diplomatic decision by Chinese court to restrict the burgeoning number of trade missions to port areas. In the context of Kedah conquest, the archaeological remains, though indicate the presence of Indian pottery; argue that the port population was largely of local extraction (religious remains) and thus counters the conquest theory.

In southern India, a series of merchant associations developed powerful networks and vertical monopolies, from tied manufacturers to private armies. These are of particular interest in relation to trade with Sumatra and the Malaya peninsula, and to Javanese ands Balinese responses to the growth in trade during the same period. During this period (10th to 13th century AD), there occurred a shift in focus of merchant associations from the west coasts towards the east, stimulated by increasing trade with the east, was accompanied by a broadening of the range of commodities traded (Iron, cotton, textile). The effects on India were developments in the weaving and dying industries as introduction of the Draw Loom and of the spinning wheel and revival of coin-minting.

The Indian trade interest in the eastern coast of the Indian Ocean is well reflected in the Tamil language inscriptions and south Indian religious remains found on the eastern fringe of the Indian Ocean, from Burma down to Sumatra. Many of these are bilingual inscriptions which either bear donations or gifts made to religious centers (Monastery and Vishnu and Siva temples) or gives description of trade and the articles involved in trade. These inscriptions refer to South Indian merchant associations- Maningramam, actively involved in transit trade bypassing the Malacca strait; and Nanadesi branch of the Ayyarole. Most of the 13th century Tamil inscriptions do not mention merchant associations, perhaps reflecting the sharp decline of this economic power during this period as evident also from the epigraphic records within southern India.

Tamil inscriptions and religious and other remains suggested establishment of the South Indian enclaves to the west of the Malacca straits. These conclaves were confined to regions accessible directly from the Indian Ocean dure to the firm hold of Srivijaya over the groupings, involving very mixed personnel and structures of southeast Asian along with South Asian, as suggested by evidences from Java and Bali, such as formation of the Banigrama. It was followed by the appearance of a local version of the Banigrama in the major north-coast parts of both the islands like at Julah which was a predominantly local merchant association, along with some foreigners. They were indigenous organizations collected to the local economic system as tax farmers licensed by the rulers. This trend was short-lived. The abandonment of the term may reflect both the retreat of organized south Indian groups to the western edge of the archipelago and the fact that in Javanese and Balinese states the relations which tax-farming merchants maintained with the political leadership were essentially personal, patron-client links. Individual foreign traders from south India were present in maritime Southeast Asian ports as merchants and tax-farmers, both were before and after the appearance of Banigrama inscriptions.

The items of trade included crops like rice,areca nuts, pepper, mysobalans , iron, cotton (raw and textile) , thread, wax, honey, sandalwood, aloeswood, silk, rose water, yak’s tail, camphor oil, civet, horses, elephants, medicinal herbs, metals(gold,silver), semi-precious stones, pearls etc. There occurred noticeable changes in the patterns of domestic consumption and production owing to large volumes of foreign imports and their varied distribution. As far as ports are concerned, although the Malacca straits port-hierarchy of Srivijaya played an important role inn manufacturing largely indigenous hold over the sea-trade links eastwards from the India-Ocean, partly by forcing powerful south Indian merchant associations to trade on local terms, it was the state of Mataram in Java played the key role in moulding maritime southeast Asia’s shared economic culture.

Ritual as a Legitimising Tool

In context of influence of Indic elements, it was used as a means of elevating the status of indigenous rulers both in the eyes of their own people and with the visiting Indian merchants whose presence was essential to continue prosperity.

The Indian rituals and celestial deities provided the sacro-religious legitimacy to local rulers. The Brahmanas played an important part by performing rituals and concocting genealogies for the local rulers, thus providing legitimacy. By 10th century AD many texts like few parvans of Mahabharata were translated into local languages like Javanese prose. Most of Sanskrit language inscriptions were largely religious in context. The continuing impact of cultural borrowings from India was, however reflected in these reflections by the heavy use of Sanskrit conceptual vocabulary, the integration of some Indian weights and measures into the local system and the adoption of Sanskrit or Sanskritised names. The presence of two Buddha statues at Kotachina (Sumatra) points to the influence of Chola sculpture and thus the foreign trade (imported material to build statues). In Kadiri period in east Java, predominance of Vaishnavism is reflected in court poetry of old Javanese literature. Other examples are the great temple of Angkorvat in Cambodia. Translations of many texts took place like Raghuvamsa. Apart from Buddhist sculpture, an Indian affinity is reflected in the particular from of Tantricism in east Java. Islam in these regions also came from Indian subcontinent, not from Arabic world.

Conclusion

It may be argued that the Southeast Asian states borrowed extensively from the broader Indian religious traditions in manner that suggests a self-conscious balancing of ideas thought to be useful for the maintenance of power in economies at once agrarian and mercantile. Indian export trade provoked shifts in the habits of consumption that in turn stimulated innovations in the local production. The religious and cultural impact was restricted to the rulers and the elite sections of the society and did not make many inroads into the local level. Thus the economic competition and mutual influence rather than forceful confrontation characterized the relations between Southeast Asia and India, which counters the Indianisation/colonization theory.

Bibliography:-

# Abraham,M, 1988, Two Medieval Merchant Guilds of South India, New delhi, Ch 5-p227-281.

# Christie, J.W., 1995, State formation In early Maritime Southeast Asia, BTLV

# Christie, J.W., 1999, The Banigrama in the Indian Ocean and the Java sea during the early Asian trade boom, Communarute’s maritimes de l’ocean indien, Brepols

# De Casparis, J.G., 1983, India and Maritime Southeast Asia: A lasting Relationship, Third Sri Lanka Endowment Fund Lecture.

# Hall, K.R., 1985, Maritime Trade and State development in early Southeast Asia, Honolulu.

# Walters, O.W., 1967, Early Indonesian Commerce, Ithaca.

Review: George Perkovich’s India’s Nuclear Bomb

I. Introduction

The catharsis in Stanley Kubrick’s 1963 film noir classic Dr. Strangelove (Or: How I learned to stop worrying and love the Bomb) has a cowboy riding into the sunset on a nuclear missile warhead heading for a Soviet nuclear facility that will trigger off a doomsday device, in what would become one of the biggest visual spoofs on the deterrence doctrine (MAD) of the Cold War era. Does George Perkovich’s India’s Nuclear Bomb have a similar effect- demonisation of structural realism and a scandalous exposé on India’s mysterious nuclear folklore- on contemporary nuclear nonproliferation and unproliferation theory?

Broadly speaking, Perkovich seems to operate at two levels: (a) at the level of research where he shatters some of the predominant ‘mythologies’ of India’s nuclear programme; and (b) at the level of international theory, derived from the former, where he develops a stark critique of Structural Realism, and to some extent, challenges the idea of the democratic peace. Yet, these ‘levels’ are not distinct: India’s nuclear bomb is a continuously evolving ‘dialogue’ between them. To understand Perkovich’s argument (in a broader context), I have followed a slightly unorthodox approach: first, I look at his arguments for India’s nuclearisation (in the form of the ‘dialogue’); and then, these arguments are abstracted (into two distinct levels, of research and its implication on theory), allowing for their critical deconstruction within the broader genealogical paradigm. Therefore, prior to analyzing both these aspects of his argument, it would be worthwhile to ‘cite’ its genealogy, which, as will be demonstrated subsequently, gives rise to certain very compelling questions in the form of paradoxes.

Intellectual Framework for Understanding Perkovich

_____________________________________________________________________

                       |GENEALOGY: level of theory|

                           LEVEL OF THEORY

|CONSTRUCTION/DIALOGUE|-->|ABSTRACTION|>|DECONSTRUCTION|

                     LEVEL OF RESEARCH

           INDIAN CONTEXT: level of research|

_____________________________________________________________________

II. Re-siting Perkovich’s Genealogy: Paradoxes in the Paradigm

Now: this is something that has somehow evaded almost all commentators on Perkovich. By taking recourse to Scott Sagan’s now quintessential three theoretical models on "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?" (International Security, Winter 1996-97) [where he argues that security considerations alone do not drive nuclear proliferation, but also domestic politics and ‘nuclear symbolism’], they have missed the broader polemic in which Perkovich might be situated: the relevance of the (post-modern/ post-colonial) nation-state in international relation. The most common ‘fallacy’ that emerges from this ‘oversight’ of locating India’s Nuclear Bomb in the rather blurred trajectory of strategic writing on India’s nuclearisation- from Itty Abraham, K. Subrahmanyam to Jasjit Singh- not only suffers from a remarkable lack of prior informed formulations (in which respect, Perkovich is to be treated as something of a pioneer), but also confines the debate to specific unproliferation issues within specific geo-political security contextualisation(s): its implications/ conclusions become intrinsically self-limiting.

And to limit Perkovich’s argument to the Nuclear Un-/Proliferation paradigm is to deny much of it’s critical importance. The significance of ‘cultural nationalism’- an assertive, often aggressive, breed of nationalism functioning within the post-colonial narrative that marks [their] quest for identity, and not just equity, prestige and glory (Hobsbawm, Nation and Nationalism since 1780)- as a factor in itself, as opposed to it’s conjectural implications on national nuclearisation and global unproliferation, seems to me, to constitute the bedrock of his argument. In a curious sort of way, this also becomes the argument against the ‘retreat of the state’ theories, since it constantly emphasizes the role of nation states as principal actors, that are more often than not directly juxta positioned against international institutions [IAEA, NPT regime and CTBT], in Perkovich’s riveting ‘story’.

This broadening of Genealogy inflicts Perkovich’s arguments with significant paradoxes. First: if the nation-state is of the primary importance, then wouldn’t unproliferation be best achieved at the level of states, and not at the level of international systems and structures? Secondly: if equity (not identity per se) is the central focus of the post-colonial nation-states, then wouldn’t disputes between them be best solved if the ‘therapist’ (mentioned by Perkovich elsewhere in the Annie Hall simile) were absent? Third: what is the relation between the post-colonial state and international institutions, and why does one state behave differently from others with respect to them? Fourth: if the ‘democratic radicalization of the post-colonial nation state’- an argument against democratic peace theories- hinders unproliferation (rollback), then they are no different from so-called modern(pre-colonial) nation states, and consequently the need for applying the post-colonial narrative automatically diminishes, reinstating the primacy of security arguments.

To sum: relocating Perkovich’s argument at the genealogical level reveals the central flaw in India’s Nuclear Bomb. It simply falters at the level of induction (derived no doubt from the Indian experience), preventing the formation of a definitive alternative to structural realist theory. Yet: it is precisely this flaw that creates the requisite ‘tension’ necessary for theory-building.

It’s primary importance, thus, lies somewhere else.

III. Constructing India’s nuclear bomb: Dialogue

A. Presenting Perkovich: Disinventing anarchy

"India’s Nuclear Bomb aims to tell a story; a story of how the nation of Gandhi, the world’s largest democracy, wrestled with the bomb. In the story there are some intriguing characters and fascinating debates and dilemmas. It is also a story about how Indians think about nuclear weapons in a way that is very different from how we in the west were taught to think about nuclear weapons."(November 16, 1999,The Carnegie Endowment Roundtable with George Perkovich)

Political scientist John Mearsheimer recently observed that India and Pakistan "live in an area of the world that is remarkably dangerous and, therefore, they want to go to great lengths to make sure that they have the wherewithal to protect themselves." If anything, the focus of Perkovich’s argument is to contradict this assumption. (The real dangers, says Perkovich, are ‘internal’.) In doing so, he traces the evolution of the nuclearisation process in India posing the question: why did India explode the bombs when it did; and as a corollary, why not earlier? The latter part is answered by siting (a) the nuclear ambivalence of India that resulted in an ‘open nuclear option policy’; and (b) the hindrance (technological, political) posed by the US led nonproliferation regime. The former is explained using a plethora of arguments, all seeking to undermine the national security dilemma that have been used to justify Pokhran-II: India’s quest for prestige and equity in the international system; the ultra-nationalist rhetoric and policy of the BJP government; the democratic inertia against unproliferation; and last but not the least, the lack of institutionalized nuclear policy making machinery. This, then, broadly speaking constitutes Perkovich’s central argument. To examine more closely the relevance of this argument in the context of India, it would be worthwhile to make a cursory survey of some other works (that claim to be) of the same genre.

B. Looking at Perkovich: The Indian Perspective

Interestingly, the ‘hollowness of the quest for prestige argument’ have appeared elsewhere, for example, in Bidwai and Vanaik’s lamentable pulp-book, South Asia on a Short Fuse; and the romanticized essay of Arundathi Roy "The End of Illusion". Bidwai and Vanaik, although divorced from objectivity, point to the irrationality-factor based on the ‘patriarchal’ nature of India’s nuclear bomb [ ‘Toys for the Boys’ ]; and Ms. Roy, using powerful imagery, highlights its immorality based on the social costs of nuclearisation and the imminent consequences of a holocaust. Both these works however have little bearing on international theory and unproliferation study; both suffer from intoxicating tendencies to moralize. At the other end, there is the argument of Jaswant Singh, in Defending India, whose primary importance lies in the fact that the author is also the principal official ideologue for the Bomb. Here, he harps on two themes: (a) India’s growing security dilemma vis a vis Pakistan and China, and the ineffectiveness of the GOI to do anything about it in light of international (read US) pressure; and (b) her quest for nuclear preeminence that would end nuclear apartheid. [Ironically, in mimicking the security argument of the West, he then undermines the specificity of the Indian bomb; and by emphasizing ‘continuity’ of Pokhran-II with Pokhran-I, he diminishes his own party’s importance.] For these reasons, these works may be dismissed as pseudo-academic pamphleteering, representing at best, the two extremes of the nuclear polemic in India.

However, this is not to say that there has been no serious informed debate on nuclearisation in India: K. Subrahmanyam, Jasjit Singh, Raja Mohan, Chellany are just some of the luminaries who have contributed to its evolution. Although some of them may have been given to some degree of moralizing (which seems to be an inescapable Indian trait!), their arguments reflect India’s strategic concerns, against her constantly deepening security dilemma and the ever assertive ‘nonproliferation’ regime; while at the same time advocating ‘integration’ rather than supporting the GOI’s policy of remaining in perpetual conflict with the international system. [Itty Abraham seems to be a renegade of sorts; and consequently, becomes Perokovich’s intellectual ‘idol’.] Perkovich’s arguments, derive from, and inturn contradict some of, their strategic assumptions, but in the final analysis, he does not defer very much from their normative position that India will have to be integrated into the international system on the basis of the equity principle, where her security concerns, perceived and real, will have to be addressed; and a compensatory and reciprocatory attitude to bring about her unproliferation will have to be taken: unless and until the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group undertakes effective measures for nuclear disarmament (Art. IV of NPT), then it would be unreasonable to expect India to roll back her nuclear programme, given the domestic political considerations (democratic inertia) and ‘nuclear prestige’. However employing this same argument at the broader genealogical level (of the post-modern nation state), the conclusions can be remarkably different: the Indian ambivalence, as also reflected in its nuclear policy, becomes surprisingly less moralist and more realistic (!). K. Subrahmanyam, whom Perkovich has not failed to criticize says this about his book: "With a great deal of empathy and understanding of the Indian psyche, George Perkovich leads us through contradictory perceptions of events to give us a sense of the evolution of nuclear decision making in India. What emerges is a highly nuanced and sensitive narration of the complex interaction between domestic and external factors that led to the nuclear tests of May, 1998 and the shattering of a number of Indian and international myths about nuclear weapons and their role in global politics."

C. Inside Perkovich’s Paradigm: The Story Unfolds

The importance of Perkovich lies in two aspects, both of them associated with the documentation and assessment of the process (through wide coverage, insightful research and sheer objectivity- to use M.V. Kamat’s words) rather than the explanations offered for their outcome: first, in its insightful revelations of the decision making process or the black box of India’s nuclear establishment; and secondly, in the assessment of India’s security dilemma (paradoxically?) vis a vis her relationship with US, China and Pakistan. [A major flaw with the latter is that it derives primarily from the assumptions made by Dennis Kux (Estranged Democracies): this brilliant book often ignores the ‘sentimental’ aspects governing India’s (relatively cold) response to American overtures, while drawing heavily on realist considerations that marked America’s procrastinated disengagement with India on multiple levels. When Perkovich explains nuclear decisions before 1974 (what he calls Phase I), he seems to rely more on ‘realist’ explanations[the dependency of India’s nuclear programme on ‘realist’ institutions and actors]; and suddenly switches track to more ‘domestic’ and 'prestige' oriented factors. The blueprint for this is clearly Kux, but its effects on Perkovich’s own argument are not so generous.]

Upto Pokhran-I

Expanding on Itty Abraham’s premise that the scientists of India’s nuclear establishment have yielded asymmetric influence over India’s nuclear black box, Perkovich investigates further. This deductive approach is what distinguishes Perkovich from other works mentioned earlier, most of which follow an inductive route to rationalize policy decisions. He examines relevant archival records, explores an ocean of declassified material, lucubrates evidence through dangerous mine/mind-fields (interviews, newspaper reports), to build a compelling, and more often than not indisputable tale. [The reader might notice that this reviewer, while being critical of Perkovich’s ‘conclusions’, will have very little say against the ‘story’.] The foundation of India’s nuclear ambivalence- between her ‘spiritualist’ desire to moralize against violence [Gandhianism] and her ‘realist’ efforts to be recognized among the great powers- is laid by (a) citing Nehru’s statements where his dominant image white washed their (concealed?) nuclear ambiguity; (b) analyzing the powerful, charismatic, personality of Homi Bhabha, driven by ‘prestige’ rather than ‘morality’ factor; and (c) the close relationship between them that gave birth to a overtly secretive, highly centralised, de-institutionalised nuclear establishment: nuclear policy decisions were made through dialogues between these two gentlemen: public focus on nuclear issues (such as in the aftermath of the Indo-China War (1962), and China’s nuclear tests) did not seem to cast great pressure or influence on this early decision making as did the need to reconcile ‘realist’ considerations such as the need for US (and other: Canadian, French and Soviet) technological assistance on the one hand, and the nonproliferation regime on the other.

The early history therefore involves negotiations between Bhabha and the US Atomic Establishment, which went from Roosevelt’s ‘Atoms for Peace’ programme to capitalize on the emergent international nuclear energy market to the instatement of Gilpatric committee’s recommendations to strictly impose nonproliferation, while in the interregnum exploring, overruling and dismissing the possibility of aiding under safeguards India’s nuclear weapons programme to counter and limit the Communist threat . The effect of this seriously handicapped India’s ‘indigenous’ nuclear programme, and compelled its leaders to compensate for their less-than-expected target requirements of nuclear energy output capacities by channeling resources into ‘peaceful’ nuclear explosive engineering (NEE) [under Raja Ramanna], which were, so far, not covered by the NPT regime or IAEA restrictions. Thus after Nehru, Shashtri redefined nuclear ambivalence from the ‘open nuclear option’ strategy to one that specifically allowed for ‘peaceful nuclear explosions’ (PNE). Once again, his Gandhian image prevented a formal political realization of this ‘shift’. At the level of the Atomic Establishment itself, the focus shifted from nuclear energy outputs to ‘national security’ preparedness- a much more valid argument for its now questionable budgetary requirements. The restraint was predominantly due to the exaggerated pacifist leanings of Sarabhai, Bhabha’s successor, who diverted much of the aid from atomic research programme to the newly created space research organization and ofcourse, the clogging of ‘technological assistance’ channels by the NPT. In terms of the security dilemma, the emphasis seemed to shift from India-China-U.S., to Pakistan-India-China (showing gradual waning of US interest in the region). With Sarabhai and Shashtri dead, the road seemed to lead directly to the deserts of Pokhran.

The above factors have led Perkovich to dramatically underplay the national security concern of India: the trajectory of Pokhran-I was primarily domestic; its significance was the heightening of India’s prestige in her own eyes. Mrs. Gandhi’s waning popularity during the Emergency years- her need to come up with yet another powerful symbolism; the Atomic scientists’ (uninformed) motivation to have ‘supreme mastery over the atom’; and lack of institutionalized nuclear policy making structures which made it impossible to assess the ‘international fallout’ of nuclear tests or even explore the possibilities of a rudimentary nuclear doctrine- all led India to test her first nuclear devices.

The Interregnum: between war and peace

Then: due to international pressure, her nuclear program ran into troubled waters; and the domestic political realization of the negative cost-benefit analysis fueled by the resurgence of Gandhians (JP, Morarji et al) formulated a remarkably restrained nuclear policy for the next twenty four years [phase II]. Here too, noticeable shifts can be seen under Perkovich’s microscope: the informed public debate on nuclear policy shifted from the ‘morality’ paradigm to strategic arguments for and against nuclearisation, highlighting the ever increasing gap between elite and ‘public’ opinions (cosmopolitan Vs the rest): China and US seemed to take a back seat to Pakistan’s own efforts- seen to be supported by China and not unwelcomed by the US- to test and deploy nuclear weapons. The growing dependence of America on Pakistan during the Afghanistan crises, and her premature condemnation of India’s role in both the ’65 and ’71 conflicts, led India to seek and explore possibilities of further collaboration with the Soviets. Slowly but surely, India was drawn into the cold war politics arena, and this only fueled her insecurity: during the ‘80s she sought to overcome this by drastically increasing her spending on conventional weapons; and making inroads into the integrated ballistic missile technology, which for the first time, brought the atomic and defense establishments together. Her newly ‘bought’ sense of security had a twofold impact vis a vis her relationship with China, which had over time ‘normalized’ significantly (primarily by not focussing on Pakistan and the US): on the one hand, this gave her confidence to explore areas of greater bilateral cooperation with China; while on the other, it reinforced the notion that India’s real and only ‘potential’ enemy is China. All this while, the Atomic establishment- which had acquired a life and logistics of its own- had been working independently, sometimes in violation of international agreements and IAEA safeguards, and it was quite obvious that both India and Pakistan now had undeclared nuclear weapons capability. It was against this background- one Time magazine cover proclaimed India as ‘Asia’s new Superpower’ and Rajiv Gandhi as its new leader- that the hawkish general Sundarji flexed his muscle in the largest joint military exercise code named Operation Brasstacks provoking a similar response by the Pakistanis in what could have culminated in the first conflict between two nuclear powers. That this did not happen reaffirmed the prevalence of the deterrence logic in the subcontinent by the hawks; and that it was this close to happening made the doves abhor the bombs even more. At the policy level, it meant a recognition of each other’s nuclear capabilities, and the unstated assumption that they would not- and could not afford to- attack each other’s nuclear establishments.

IV. Deconstructing Perkovich’s Bomb

A. Deadly Democracy

"Yet, in other countries-France, India, South Africa, and the United Kingdom-factors beyond security drove the acquisition of nuclear weapons: the quest for national grandeur, prestige, and independence; the ambition and persuasiveness of leading scientists attracted by the technological challenge and the desire to display personal and national prowess; domestic political jockeying-all of these elements stand out as important components of proliferation." (Perkovich, Fall 1998 issue of FOREIGN POLICY).

Post-Rajiv, Perkovich seems to concentrate more on the rise of a radicalized, ultra-nationalistic BJP- from the ruins of the erstwhile Jan Sangh- the only political party that openly advocated India’s deployment of nuclear weapons, and what's more, cloaked it, not in terms of security compulsions, but for the ‘glory of the Hindu race and rashtra (nation)’: "The Bharatiya Janata Party, has long felt that nuclear weapons offer a quicker ride to the top. Like atavistic nationalists elsewhere, they believe that pure explosive power will somehow earn respect and build pride." (George Perkovich, Newsday, Friday, May 15, 1998; Page A5: "India Errs Nuclear Power Isn't Real Power")

Here: spurious comparisons with Bidwai, Vanaik & Co. come to mind- works we have already somewhat summarily (it may be argued: unfairly) dismissed as pulp, quick fix prescriptions and proscriptions of the intellectual left. But let me state this yet again: Perkovich cannot- and should not- belong in the same category. The ‘cultural-baggage’ of the Hindutva hard-core (to adapt Braudel’s phrase) has after all exercised little influence on the GOI’s policy, despite all the talk of a ‘hidden agenda’ et al. Actually, political instability (also: democracy, with due respect to Mr. Perkovich) following the exit of the Rao government in 1996 does not seem to have been a key-factor at all in pushing India (if that phrase can be applied!) towards Pokhran-II. Political whimsy- such as the one which might have compelled Rao to ‘masterly inactivity’ once again following the Tim Wiener’s New York Times exposé on his intentions to go nuclear, or the one that led Vajpayee to 'authorize' nuclear tests in his 13 day stint as premier and the one that ultimately led Gujral to see Warren Christopher as an imperialist snob and consequently dissuaded him from signing the CTBT- has certainly had some impact, but even these were ultimately due to the larger ‘systemic processes’ [economic sanctions against India, political insecurity, the imperialist connotations of CTBT]. The BJP’s oft-cited propagandized commitment to India’s nuclearisation is certainly a factor; but taken by itself, it poses more questions than it answers: why hasn’t the BJP applied its ultra-nationalistic prescriptions to other politically sensitive issues (like Ram Temple, Art. 370 and the Uniform Civil Code) when it could, without consultation with its allies, detonate the thermonuclear device? The answer seems to contradict much of the ‘domestic’ assumptions centered around the fundamentalism of the BJP: the bottom-line is that there was a definitive ‘politico-democratic’ consensus on Pokhran-II even before it happened (not on the other issues). For Perkovich to accept that would be truly frightening, and rather than selectively shatter some of the myths about India’s nuclear bomb, it would, once and for all, demolish the ‘idea of India’ dominant in the West, and indeed ‘mirrored’ in India itself.

"Democracy causes problems, however, when nonproliferation requires "unproliferation"-rollback, reductions, or controls over nuclear-weapons capabilities. With the exceptions of Argentina and Brazil, no democracies with publicly known nuclear-explosives programs have initiated nuclear rollback." Perkovich, therefore, avoids the ‘maximalist’ interpretation of his own evidence based on a wider genealogical approach, and instead focusses on specific unproliferation issues that can very easily be situated in Sagan’s own formulations: "Perkovich's book issues a strong and creative note of caution against the global optimism of 'democratic peace theory.' For in India, democratic competition has encouraged resistance to the global nonproliferation regime that is a bulwark against the threat of nuclear war. This somber analysis of the Indian experience warns against complacency concerning the future of the global nuclear order."

Relocating this argument in a wider genealogical perspective will reveal that it is not democracy, but the very conception of the Democratic Principle, that hinders unproliferation: in the century prior to the last, it sowed the seeds for the self-destruction of the then dominant western institution of Imperialism (Edward Said, Orientalism); and now, in the last half of the last century of the last millennium, it has once again emerged as the dominant critique of the present paramount great power institution, of the Nuclear Regime. [Hence the situating of the genealogy of Perkovich’s argument in the beginning of the review.]

B. Pricking the atomic bubble: a private eye’s Survey of the atomic establishment

Having sufficiently ‘disengaged’ BJP’s hardliners from India’s nuclearisation, it leaves sufficient ‘space’ to begin a search for other factors (remember: Perkovich has done more than enough to dismiss the security factor, and this will also be analyzed subsequently). The most compelling evidence in favor of Pokhran-II comes from the character of the Atomic Establishment itself, which, given its specific positioning in nuclear policy making, has become relatively independent of military or even broader political control. It has already been pointed out that this establishment has ‘acquired a life and logistics of its own’: "A handful of politicians instigated by a handful of scientists with little experience in international affairs was pushing India across a portentous strategic threshold whose implications they did not fully appreciate." (p. 412) What were the primary motivations of the atomic establishment? What is its internal dynamics? Who were the people who led it? What were their primary considerations? It is here that Perkovich excels himself, offering, for the first time, the most comprehensive history on the evolution of India’s nuclear programme: "The most likely site for nuclear war is the Indian subcontinent, but we have little understanding of India's nuclear program. This will change with George Perkovich's fascinating and important study. It is informed, free from bias, and a great read as well." (Robert Jervis, Adlai E. Stevenson Professor of International Politics, Columbia University)

Suffice it to say here that during Bhabha’s time, the position of the Chairman of AEC became all-powerful, and to a great extent (when politicians did try to question their claims, as during the time of Shashtri, or when they sought to make their decisions seem infallible based on the authority of the Chairman), unquestionable. This high degree of centralization made the personality of the Chairman all the more critical in nuclear decision making, since he controlled all channels between the atomic establishment and the Prime Minister, thereby making the ‘nuclear circle’ complete. Under Bhabha’s charismatic leadership, the atomic establishment set itself very high, and what appears in retrospect, somewhat unrealistic, targets of energy output. When this could not be met, Bhabha- and others after him- sought to compensate for this lack of efficiency by pushing for an atomic test, that would restore its lost credibility, and further, put an end to questioning of its budgetary allocation: therefore, the atomic establishment increasingly sought to portray itself as less of an ‘energy sector’ and more of a national security concern. This qualitative difference made up for its quantitative under-achievement. Sarabhai seems to be one exception, but even during his tenure, there was no effective ‘roll back’ of the atomic programme, showing that after sometime, the atomic establishment was on an ‘automatic’ if not irreversible path towards nuclearisation.

Perkovich shows how- time and again- leaders of this establishment used their support-base in the media as well as among politicians to heighten ‘perceived’ security concerns to influence their political leaders to support their line. Further, he also reveals the social composition and dynamics of the atomic leadership which was primarily comprised of south-Indian Brahmins; and also refers to their increasing ‘Indianisation’ overtime. [The corollary of such an assumption is that the ‘top-brains’, like Dr. Chandrasekhar, pursued their research in foreign universities.] Another important conclusion about the atomic establishment to be drawn from Perkovich is its systematic effort to keep the military/ defense services from influencing nuclear policy making. On the plus side, this prevented the 'militarization' of the nuclear programme (as did occur during President Zia’s rule of Pakistan), but on the negative side, it also hindered the evolution of a nuclear doctrine based on the systemic analysis of India’s security environment. The atomic establishment, therefore, pursued a dual strategy: they emphasized the ‘nuclearisation of India’s security’ but (in order to keep the military at bay) strongly opposed the ‘securitization of India’s nuclear programme’. In this, they were helped by the politicians’ natural fear of a military coup d’etat, and the possibility of inter-service rivalry for control of these weapons. [As late as 1969, Mrs. Gandhi feared that the acting PM Gulzari Lal Nanda would use the military to dislodge her (Pupul Jayakar, Indira).]

The atomic establishment (represented by ISRO) and the military began collaborating after 1982 on the integrated ballistic missile programme of the DRDO under the tutelage of Abul Kalam. Surprisingly this collaboration has proved remarkably efficient; but at the same time, it has brought the Pakistanis closer to the Chinese in their race to compete with the Indians in this field as well. Perkovich also undertakes an extensive survey of India’s professed atomic capabilities as opposed to her real ones; her increasing dependence on collaboration with Soviet, Canadian, French, even Chinese (in one instance), and most importantly American nuclear establishments; her covert dealings to secure heavy-water from a German arms dealer and other incidents of violation of IAEA regulations; internal politics of the atomic leadership; internal rivalry between the ‘physicists’ and ‘engineers’ for control of the weapon programme; technical outlays, difficulties and flaws in their thinking; and environmental vulnerability. To sum: the most comprehensive picture of India’s nuclear establishment emerges.

[A critic recently lamented that the fact that it took a ‘white man’ to do so shows our imperialist-hangover about the white man’s supremacy: here his argument seems to be closer to Vanaik’s and Bidwai’s rhetoric, and denies much of the importance of Perkovich’s intensive labor in researching his subject. In any case, a survey of his notes at the end of the book shows that interviews, important as they may be, comprise only a fraction of the information given. Most of it comes from declassified American documents, and the rest from newspaper reports (it is creditable indeed that this ‘white man’ has taken the trouble to go through the response of Hindi newspaper reports and editorials as well), and statements made by leaders, prime ministers and parliamentary debates as well as discussions of the parliamentary standing committee on defense. The implications of Perkovich’s color reflect not so much on his skin and on our own ‘orientalist’ psyche as his own mindset, as will be shown later.]

C. Responding to global nonproliferation: Black/Gray/White

The other aspect that India’s Nuclear Bomb deals with is India’s negotiations with, and the evolution of her opposition to, international treaty regimes: under V.S. Trivedi, who negotiated on India’s behalf at the NPT in Geneva, India’s arguments acquired a dogmatic tone, that seem to have become remarkably consistent with time, revealing, atleast at a myopic level, a stable diplomatic approach to nuclear issues, highlighted by the same ambivalence that informed her domestic nuclear policy making. "India argues that the United States and other nuclear weapons states have reduced the test ban treaty from a nuclear disarmament measure to a nonproliferation measure. A disarmament test ban would commit all states not to develop new types of nuclear weapons and sophisticated test-simulation technologies. The current nonproliferation treaty allows nuclear-armed states to improve their nuclear weapons while blocking the nuclear options of less technologically advanced states, such as India. Thus, it is seen as the kind of discriminatory nonproliferation measure that India has historically rejected." (George Perkovich, World Policy, Volume XIII, Number 2, Summer 1996: "India, Pakistan, and the United States: The Zero-Sum Game")

Perkovich explains India’s argument in terms of the post-colonial narrative: India would oppose any measure that would validate and legitimize the ‘Nuclear Apartheid’, and at the same time, speak for global nuclear disarmament while pursuing an ‘open nuclear option’ strategy. It is precisely these arguments that marked India’s stand at the CTBT negotiations, and her vehement opposition to the ‘entry-into-force’ clause shows the essentially moral character of her stand: under the CTBT proviso, members can pullout of the treaty giving only six months notice, and citing extraordinary circumstances, making it theoretically flexible atleast. [On this count, it may be said that Bidwai and Vanaik’s argument appears slightly more lucid.] This apparent ambiguity in India’s stand is due to her simultaneously pursuing two contradictory objectives: the moral one (i.e., global nuclear disarmament) and the realist one (i.e., the need to be recognized as a ‘great power’ by the simple way of entry into the nuclear club). Yet, Perkovich also points to the fallacy of taking this position as being entirely hypocritical and unrealistic: here he brings into picture the role of differing perspectives (between India and Pakistan, Pakistan and US, and US and India): "The Indians and Pakistanis see America variously as a hypocritical bully, a colonial power, an uncertain friend, an antagonist, a hoped-for ally, an investor, a protector, and more. Reducing these images to a simple, black-and-white view, a paradoxical perception of America emerges."(George Perkovich, World Policy, Volume XIII, Number 2, Summer 1996: "India, Pakistan, and the United States: The Zero-Sum Game") [Unlike the Americans, Indians, says Perkovich, are quite comfortable treading the ‘gray’ path.]

Ultimately he justifies it on the basis of the equity principle (another off-shoot of the democratic principle: discussed elsewhere). Broadly speaking then, in dealing with India’s response to nonproliferation measures, he points to the failure of the nonproliferation regime, and not so much India’s reluctance to sign it: "Top American officials have never been willing to do what they thought it would take to make it worthwhile for India not to go forward. In 1964 this did not happen, not in the NPT negotiations, not in 1978, not in 1994, and not since then." (Stimson lecture notes) Here he brings into scrutiny India’s response (based once again on the post-colonial narrative as well as realist considerations based on the high-dependency ratio of its ‘indigenous’ programme on US measures) to the nonproliferation legislations of the US Congress vis a vis the nuclear nonproliferation act, the Pressler Amendment (based on the Zangger Committee), and most controversially, the Brown Amendment. Indo-US relations are explored through successive presidencies and administrations, drawing significantly from Kux.

What Perkovich’s argument doesn’t quite explain is whether India’s own justification for going nuclear- although somewhat unsubstantiated- employing the ‘national security’ principle of the structural realist paradigm, is correct, and if not, to what extent.

D. The realist trap: S.O.S.!!

Post Pokhran-II, the "Question" then has to be posed: has ‘deterrence’ had a restraining effect on these hostile neighbors? If it can be answered satisfactorily in the affirmative, then the realist argument holds; if not, then it is only logical that we supplement- or for that matter, ‘deconstruct’- realistic assumptions of security in the anarchic (international) system.

In a rather insightful comment on Operation Brasstacks, Kanti Bajpai & Co. spoke of nuclearisation as the great 'equalizer': this is based on the assumption that nuclear warfare would subsume conventional warfare. Yet this argument presupposes the functioning of a (nuclear) doctrine governing nuclear warfare; or atleast acknowledged the possibility of one in the aftermath of declared nuclearisation by both countries. Reading Perkovich reveals the ‘flaw’ of this argument: the premise of ‘Brasstacks’ is essentially a realist one, drawing heavily from classical Waltzian formulations on security in the international system. India’s Nuclear Bomb clearly denies the operation of such formulations in the Indian case-study. The Pokhran-II tests were prior to the submission of the Strategic Defense Review (SDR) report; but after it was announced. "If strategic considerations had been paramount, the decision could have awaited a defense strategy review and still enabled the scientists to act prior to the entry into force of the test ban treaty in late 1999." (p 409) Perkovich uses this as the ‘clincher’ in demonstrating that security concerns did not influence India’s decision to go nuclear. After all, India, as late as 1998, didn’t possess an integrated national security apparatus. But India, for Perkovich (even though he doesn’t spell it out) is an aberration: "Israel, Pakistan, China, the Soviet Union, and the United States clearly acquired nuclear-weapons capabilities to redress objective threats to their existence or, at least in the latter three cases, to their systems of government. Yet in other countries-France, India, South Africa, and the United Kingdom-factors beyond security drove the acquisition of nuclear weapons: the quest for national grandeur, prestige, and independence; the ambition and persuasiveness of leading scientists attracted by the technological challenge and the desire to display personal and national prowess; domestic political jockeying."

On the one hand, therefore, he speaks of the ‘nuclear domino’ effect [US-->China-->India-->Pakistan-->(?)Israel] when advocating global nuclear disarmament; yet on the other, he vehemently denies the security link between [China-->India<--(?)Pakistan]. "If nonweaponized deterrence worked for the past eight years, then India and Pakistan have broken something that did not need fixing." (George Perkovich, Foreign Policy, Fall 1998; Page 12: Think Again: Nuclear Proliferation).

This seems a little strange, but when one takes into account Perkovich’s motivations for writing what he did, then the pieces of the puzzle fall into place. (The reader would note that rather than quote the author from the book, a clearer insight into his views can be found in the articles written by him around the time of Pokhran-II.) Perkovich claimed that he was telling a story "about how Indians think about nuclear weapons in a way that is very different from how we in the west were taught to think about nuclear weapons." Yet for all its investigative brilliance, Perkovich finally becomes a prisoner of his own paradigm. This story works wonderfully till Pokhran-II; but its predicament becomes obvious when he ‘takes-off’ from there to draw conclusions. It once again sinks into realist quicksand, and although he tries very hard to get out of it- proposing for instance that democracies prevent non-proliferation or even stating somewhat contradictorily "For profound cultural, historical, and political reasons, these recently liberated developing countries would rather not need a close relationship with the United States" and "But more often than one would expect, Indians and Pakistanis seem to wish to believe in American omnipotence and desire the United States to exercise its power" (!)- in the end, his need to explain ‘nuclear disarmament’ to an audience ‘back home’ in a language they can well understand finally gives him in. This flaw is recognised in the West as well: "Rich, definitive...the value of this book does not rest on the credibility of its prescriptions but in the fine quality of its narrative." (Times Literary Supplement )

To adapt an intellectual cliché: no one seems to remember that Marx began writing a critique of Hegel, and ended up in effect vindicating him; what one cannot forget is Marx’s analysis of the historical condition. Likewise, whether Mr. Perkovich’s intention of justifying global nuclear disarmament using India as a case study is fulfilled or not is immaterial; his truly superb contribution lies in uncovering the reality of the people and processes that eventually led to India’s nuclear bomb.

Notes on Bibliography:

To preserve the ‘totality’ of this review- which primarily seeks to place George Perkovich’s ideas within a broader context of both the theoretical debate as well as the specific controversy over India’s nuclear bomb- I have refrained from crowding it with footnotes, and additional comments about the sources. The first section on the Genealogical re-siting of his arguments, I have drawn cryptically from Eric Von Hobsbawm (Nations and nationalism since 1780), Partha Chatterjee (Nationalist thought and the colonial World), and Edward Said (orientalism). The critique of (Sagan’s and) Perkovich’s assumption of the democratic inertia against unproliferation is developed primarily from Edward Said’s concept of Orientalism, but also significantly from Victor Siedler’s study on modernity and patriarchy [Unreasonable Men]. The (re-)construction of Perkovich’s argument in the second section is done using Scott Sagan’s three models, while also placing it specifically in the context of the ‘Indian debate’. Although Perkovich himself seems to recognize K. Subrahmanyam’s argument (1970) as being seminal to this study (insofar as it contradicts his realist assumptions on Indo-China security dilemma), a more direct intellectual linkage is to be found with Itty Abraham (Science, Secrecy and post-colonial state, 1974), whose central premise is surprisingly similar to Perkovich. References to other strategic writers are cited mostly from within the book. A comparative remark that emphasizes the propagandizing of nuclearisation as ‘antifeminist’ and patriarchal, and the ultra-nationalistic character of the BJP is done from Praful Bidwai and Achin Vanaik’s Short Asia on a Short Fuse (from a box eloquently captioned Toys for the Boys); the critique of the CTBT presented here is of a superior lucidity. While focussing on Pokhran-I, the insight on Mrs. Gandhi’s restraint to ‘militarize’ the nuclear programme, as also Rajiv Gandhi’s abortion of the Vice-chiefs’ report (of Sundarji), is provided by biographical material supplied by MJ Akbar (Nehru), P. Jayakar (Indira Gandhi) and also from Rajiv’s proposal for universal disarmament at the 1988 Disarmament Conference, sited in his ‘collected speeches’ and analyzed briefly by Kathleen Healy (The Years of Power: International Concerns). Arundathi Roy’s essay (end of illusion) informs the debate on the immorality and irrationality of nuclear bombs. Dennis Kux (Estranged Democracies) remains the most extensive study on Indo-US relations; and serves as a blueprint for Perkovich. Biographical remarks on Krishna Menon’s role in early negotiations with the US- which surprisingly have very little references to, and what there is contradicts, Bhabha’s efforts to secure aid under ‘atoms for peace’ programme- are found in BK Nehru (Nice Guys finish Second: the Washington Years), and also, D.S. Adel (Krishna Menon and Contemporary politics): Trivedi’s own arguments at the NPT seem to reflect this position. Jaswant Singh (Defending India) serves as a vital ‘counter-argument’ to Perkovich’s questioning of India’s security and strategic concerns; as do Jasjit Singh, C. Raja Mohan, JN Dixit, Mukhopadhyay and K. Subrahmanyam (whose ideas are outlined in various newspaper articles that have been reviewed by this author in "Theorizing the Bomb"). The reference to Kanti Bajpai is from his book on Operation Brasstacks. Mearsheimer’s argument appears in an article by Perkovich written for foreign affairs, as does the Annie Hall simile (mentioned earlier). The adaptation from Marx is from J. Maguire (Political Theory of Karl Marx). Kirkus review, Times literary supplement review, Amitabh Mattoo’s review for Outlook, and additional remarks (of Kamat, Subrahmanyam, Cohen et al) further inform this study; as also Stimson lecture notes. Kenneth Waltz’s Man, State, War informs the realist premise; and is supported by the vast quantum of literature on democratic peace theories.